Retirement and Disability Research Center
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON

Ravaris Moore
New York University

Violent Victimization, Productivity Interruptions, and the Reinforcement of Social Inequality

Abstract

While evidence shows an inverse relationship between violent crime levels and measures of social mobility, less is known about the mechanisms that drive this result. This analysis investigates productivity interruptions as a potential link connecting victimization experience and the reinforcement of social inequality. Results show that violent crime leads to significantly higher odds of productivity interruptions than property crimes. Similarly, victimization incidents involving firearms or hand weapons are significantly more likely to result in productivity interruptions than unarmed offenses. Victimization processes reinforce inequality through higher odds of productivity interruptions for marginalized or less advantaged segments of the population along dimensions of sex, race/ethnicity, education, and income. Thirty years of data from the National Crime Victimization Survey show consistent losses of work time for victims and members of their households, which lower the base of federally taxable earnings that supports SSA trust funds. Also, reports of problems with work or school tripled from 2008 to 2022 suggesting a growing educational cost of victimization that could have long-term earnings implications.

1   Introduction

Research at the intersection of violent crime and inequality shows that violence creates an inter-generational context that affects mobility processes through multiple pathways. Violence is a spatial phenomenon (Light and Harris 2012) that often coexists with poverty in ways that plague the same people and places across generations (Sharkey 2008). Violence levels are correlated with neighborhood social dynamics that characterize interactions between community members (see Sampson et al. (2002) for a review of literature). Violence exposure and victimization impede mobility efforts of youth by inhibiting educational pursuits (Burdick-Will 2013, 2016; Sharkey 2010; Fry et al. 2018) and affecting personal and social development in ways that can have life course consequences (Macmillan 2001). Gun violence serves as a buttress for high homicide rates and lower longevity expectations that primarily affect black men (Sharkey 2018, Chapter 4). Evidence shows that higher levels of violent crime can lead to lower levels of expected income (Sharkey and Torrats-Espinosa 2017) indicating a connection between violence and the reproduction of inequality. More work is needed to illuminate the pathways that forge this relationship.

The role of firearm-related-violence is of particular interest given its status as an American public health crisis (Abbasi and Hswen 2024). Relative to peer high income countries, the United States has homicide rates that are 6.9 times higher due to firearm homicide rates that are 19.5 times higher (Richardson and Hemenway 2011). This points to clear differences in the structure of the American mortality structure relative to peer countries. Since longevity expectations affect life course trajectories, it is reasonable to suspect that other social structures may systematically differ between contexts contingent upon levels of gun violence. The current study works to understand how productivity interruptions following a victimization experience may lead to differences in inequality and mobility patterns.

I hypothesize that more extreme victimization experiences lead to higher odds of productivity interruptions. Since risks of victimization are higher among less advantaged segments of the population, productivity interruptions stemming from victimization experiences may be more likely as well. This creates an obstacle to social and economic mobility efforts that disproportionately hinders less advantaged groups in a way that reinforces existing forms of inequality. These interruptions can inhibit mobility efforts by causing short-term disruptions, such as earnings losses from lost work time, or long-term deviations in one's educational or professional trajectory that reshapes their lifetime earnings profile.

Analyses employ data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) spanning years 1992 to 2022 to explore patterns in both the risk of victimization and the likelihood of productivity interruptions among the victimized. Independent variable events of interest include violent crime victimization, victimization experiences aggravated by the use of hand weapons (such as bladed or blunt objects), and victimization experiences aggravated by the use of firearms. Productivity interruptions include lost work time for the victim, lost work time for a member of the victim's household, and reports of problems at work or school after one's victimization experience.

Several important results arise from this work. First, violent crime, crimes aggravated by

firearms, and crimes aggravated by hand weapons all lead to significantly higher chances of productivity interruptions for victims and members of their households. Second, productivity interruptions following victimization appear to reinforce existing inequality by being more likely to affect less advantaged segments of the population. Third, higher risks of victimization for adolescents and young adults coupled with patterned productivity interruptions for each fuel continued concern that early life victimization can yield negative consequences with life course implications. Finally, time trends show stable variation in the likelihood of lost work time for a victim or family member over the last 30 years. At the same time, the probability of reporting post-victimization problems with work or school tripled from 2008 to 2022. This presents a puzzle as to why the frequency of this type of interruption has increased independently and what this increase implies for socioeconomic destinations.

These findings have several important implications for Social Security Administration programs. First, higher chances of victimization and subsequent lost work time could be consequential for the Social Security program eligibility of some who wish to claim benefits. Second, relatively stable probabilities of work time losses for victims and their household members suggest that victimization processes siphon off a portion of labor productivity that would have produced earnings that contribute to the Social Security tax base. This implies a steady stream of lost revenue for Social Security trust funds over the last 30 years. Third, reports of problems with work or school following victimization experiences tripled from 2008 to 2022. This fuels concerns about productivity interruptions that could motivate long-term changes in educational, professional, or earnings trajectories.

2   Data

This work employs data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) spanning years 1992 to 2022. The NCVS employs a rotating panel design where households are interviewed every six months for a three-year period yielding observations of each respondent at multiple time points. These observations facilitate the identification of changes that accompany victimization experiences. The 30-year panel interviews roughly 1.8 million respondents. The analytical data reflect the experiences of almost 60,000 survey respondents who reported a victimization and identified the type of weapon employed, if any.

2.1   Central Measures

These data offer several helpful measures that are of primary interest to this work as independent variables. First, the NCVS includes a binary variable that identifies violent crime (as opposed to property crime) to serve as an independent variable to understand the effects of violent victimization. Second, the NCVS offers information on which victimization experiences involve hand weapons (such as bladed and blunt objects) or firearms. Analyses estimate the increased (or decreased) likelihood of productivity interruptions and injury associated with victimization experiences that involve a firearm or hand weapon, relative to a counterfactual of victimization by an unarmed offender. Third, the thirty year observation

window supports controlling for year fixed effects and identifying trends over time. Finally, the NCVS offers information on respondent race/ethnicity, income, education, sex, age, and marital status. These control measures help characterize the relationship between victimization processes, productivity interruptions, and particular dimensions of social inequality in a contemporary American context.

Dependent variables reflect productivity interruptions that affect one's paid work or schooling. Outcomes based on the following NCVS survey items will be assessed:

1. Victim lost work time following their first reported victimization experience: Respondent reports a loss of work time due to injuries from victimization.

2. Member of victim's household lost work time: Respondent reports that another member of their household lost work time due to respondent's victimization experience.

3. Victim reports problems with work or school: Respondent reports that victimization led to problems with job, schoolwork, boss, coworkers, or peers.

Measures of lost work time suggest a temporary contraction in productive capacity for the victimized person or a household member. Work time losses (for the victimized person or a household member) are likely indicative of lost earnings. Effects over a longer horizon are also possible if work time losses lead to job displacement or delayed professional advancement.

The third dependent measure flags problems that may arise with colleagues in professional and educational settings following victimization. Because this item specifically mentions schoolwork and peers, it admits the detection of productivity interruptions that may be consequential for the respondent's educational trajectory. Activity in this measure may be suggestive of altered educational transitions for the young, and possible changes in eventual educational attainment that could have long-term consequences over the life course.

2.2   Empirical Approach

This analysis addresses two central questions. First, how does the risk of specific types of victimization vary across the population? Second, conditional upon experiencing victimization, how do the odds of subsequent productivity interruptions differ with victim and incident characteristics? Logistic regression model will be used f

Model 1 estimates the risk of victimization according to:

$$\ln(L\left(v_i\right)) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 \Gamma + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

Variable v_i denotes a type of victimization experience (i.e., unarmed, armed with a hand weapon, or armed with a firearm). X_i is a vector of respondent characteristics and Γ is a vector of year fixed effects. β_1 offers evidence concerning which segments of the population face the highest risks of victimization. Estimates from β_0 and γ help illuminate trends in victimization risk over time.

Model 2 estimates the likelihood of productivity interruptions conditional upon reporting a victimization experience according to:

$$\ln(L(y_i)) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \cdot \text{Violent}_i + \gamma_2 \cdot \text{Firearm}_i + \gamma_3 \cdot \text{Hand Weapon}_i + \gamma_4 X_i + \gamma_5 \Gamma + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Above, y_i is binary outcome that equals one when respondents report specific type of productivity interruption (i.e., lost work time for the victim, lost work time for a household member, or problems with work or school for the victim). The coefficient, γ_1, expresses the odds of productivity interruptions associated with violent crime (relative to property crime). Coefficients γ_2 and γ_3 estimate the odds of productivity interruptions associated with a victimization incident aggravated by a firearm or hand weapon, respectively, relative to a unarmed victimization. As in Model 1, X_i is a vector of respondent characteristics and γ is a vector of year fixed effects.

The primary independent variables of interest reflect the effects of violent victimization, and victimization incidents aggravated by firearms and hand weapons. γ_4 characterizes differences in the risks of productivity interruptions conditional upon respondent characteristics to assess which population subgroups are more likely to face productivity interruptions following victimization. Year fixed effects estimates from γ_5 facilitate an understanding of trends over time.

2.3   Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for two cuts of these data.[1] The first column describes characteristics of the full weighted NCVS sample. The second column describes the subset of respondents who report a victimization experience and offered information concerning whether and what type of weapon was involved in the victimization experience.

Full sample proportions offer important information about this nationally representative sample. Thirteen percent of respondents report some form of victimization over the course of their three-year period in the rotating panel. 2.6 percent of the full sample report a violent victimization experience. Smaller proportions of the sample report instances of aggravated victimization involving weapons. 0.3 percent of the sample report a victimization experience involving a firearm, while 0.5 percent report a victimization experience involving a hand weapon (such as a blunt or bladed weapon). 3.2 percent of respondents report a victimization experience with an unarmed offender.

Among the dependent variables, 2.9 percent of respondents in the victimized sub-sample report a loss of work time following a victimization experience. 2.2 percent reported that their victimization lead to a loss of work time for a member of the victim's household. 9.1 percent of respondents reported problems at work or school following their victimization experience.

This diverse sample exhibits observable variation in respondent age, gender, marital sta-

---

[1]Standard deviations are omitted since all variables are binary. A value of "1" reflects the condition described by the variable name. A value of "0" implies the converse.

tus, educational attainment, income, and race/ethnicity across a weighted sample size of 1,596,792 respondents.[2]

3   Results

Several important results arise from this work. First, violent crime, crimes aggravated by firearms, and crimes aggravated by hand weapons all lead to significantly higher chances of productivity interruptions for victims and members of their households. Second, productivity interruptions following victimization appear to reinforce existing inequality by being more likely to affect less advantaged segments of the population. Third, higher risks of victimization for adolescents and young adults coupled with patterned productivity interruptions for each fuel continued concern that early life victimization can yield negative consequences with life course implications. Finally, time trends show stable variation in the likelihood of lost work time for a victim or family member over the last 30 years. At the same time, the probability of reporting post-victimization problems with work or school tripled from 2008 to 2022. This poses a bit of a puzzle as to why the frequency of this type of interruption has changed drastically and independently. It also suggests that the costs of victimization may be growing in a way that was previously less pronounced. The sections below discuss each of these findings along with their supporting evidence.

3.1   Violent Victimization, Weapons, and Productivity Interruptions

Table 3 presents logistic regression estimates of the odds of productivity interruptions following a victimization experience for NCVS respondents. Results show that victimization incidents involving violent crimes, firearms, or hand weapons significantly increase the likelihood of observing each type of productivity interruptions in this analysis.

The model estimates odds of productivity interruptions for a reference respondent who is a 25 to 40 year-old never-married non-Hispanic white male with a high school education, no military experience, and annual earnings below \$35,000. Estimates in Table 4 present the probabilities of productivity interruptions conditional upon being victimized based on estimates in Table 3.

Within this victimized sample, productivity interruptions are least likely among victims of property crimes by unarmed assailants. Under this condition, 0.40 percent of victims report lost work time, 0.40 percent report lost work time for a household member, and 0.30 percent report subsequent problems with work or school.

Conditioning upon violent crime—as opposed to property crime—increases the likelihood of productivity interruptions substantially. Among respondents reporting a violent crime victimization by an unarmed assailant, 3.3 percent report lost work time, 0.8 percent report lost work time for a household member, and 3.3 percent report problems with work or school.

---

[2]The full sample has 1,883,390 respondents. Person-year sample weights assign a weight of zero to 286,598 respondents yielding an N of 1,596,792.

Violent crimes aggravated by weapons—particularly firearms or hand weapons—lead to a higher likelihood of productivity interruptions. Violent crimes involving hand weapons have a 7.0 percent chance of yielding lost work time for the victim and 4.6 percent chance of subsequent problems with work or school. Violent victimization experiences involving firearms have a 4.1 percent chance of lost work time for the victim and and 4.5 percent chance of problems with work or school. In both cases, the chance of lost work time for a household member lies around 1.1 percent.

Among the types of interruptions analyzed in this study, loss of work time and problems at work or school for the victimized person occur most frequently. Increasing the severity of a victimization experience (ie., shifting from property crime to violent crime, or unarmed to aggravated) increases the likelihood of each type of listed interruption. While these results offer no evidence that firearms lead to a higher likelihood of productivity interruptions than hand weapons, they also fail to account for differences in lethality between firearms and hand weapons.

Evidence strongly suggests that the risk of death is significantly higher when violent incidents involve guns (Braga et al. 2021). Cook (2018) finds that victims of gun-shot wounds are 7.6 times as likely to die as a victim who is seriously injured in a knife attack. For this reason, the higher likelihood of productivity interruptions for hand weapons should not be interpreted as an indication that firearm victimization incidents are less consequential. Instead, it likely reflects that severely injured victims of firearm-related-crimes are more likely to die and lose and their productive capacity permanently in a way that these data fail to capture.

Recall that percentages in Table 4 were computed from logistic model parameter estimates in Table 3. Parameter estimates and standard errors offer evidence of significant differences in the odds of productivity interruptions for violent crimes relative to property crimes, and also for crimes involving firearms or hand weapons relative to victimization by an unarmed offender. Thus, a violent victimization and/or the introduction of weapons both lead to significantly higher odds of productivity interruptions for the victim and household members.

3.2   Does violent victimization reinforce existing forms of socioeconomic inequality?

The discussion above centers upon the probability of productivity interruptions for a 25 to 40 year-old never-married non-Hispanic white male who completed high school, has no military experience, and earns less than $35,000 per year. While this presentation helps to express differences in the likelihood of productivity interruptions by the listed incident characteristics, it ignores differences in the likelihood of productivity interruptions associated with variation in respondent characteristics.

The sections below explore differences in both the risk of victimization and the likelihood of productivity interruptions conditional upon reporting a victimization experience. Evidence from Table 2 and Table 3 shows that productivity interruptions are more likely to occur for women, persons with lower income, and certain racial and ethnic minorities. For this reason, it appears that victimization processes reinforce some forms of inequality by being

more likely to interrupt efforts at upward mobility for women, those with lower income, and specific racial and ethnic groups.

3.2.1   Sex

Relative to men, women are half as likely to encounter victimization experiences that involve firearms or hand weapons, but slightly more likely to be victimized by an unarmed assailant. Conditional upon experiencing victimization, women are 1.3 times more likely to report lost work time, 1.8 times as likely to report lost work time by a household member, and 1.9 times as likely to report subsequent problems with work or school ($p < 0.001 for each$). A comparison of odds ratio estimates in Table 3 shows that the increased odds of interruptions associated with being a female are often greater than the increased odds of productivity interruptions associated with firearms or hand weapons. This suggests that unarmed victimizations can, on average, interrupt certain dimensions of productivity for women as much as armed victimization experiences would for men.

Evidence overall suggests a potential inequality-reinforcing effect of productivity interruptions from victimization processes by sex. While women are less likely to encounter a victimization involving firearms or hand weapons, their higher likelihood of facing unarmed victimization coupled with the higher odds of interruptions for women suggests that victimization can be more damaging to the productivity of women.

3.2.2   Education

Evidence in Table 2 shows variation in the odds of victimization by educational attainment. There is no clear evidence of a monotonic change in the odds of victimization by education level. For victimization involving firearms or hand weapons, the odds of victimization are comparable at all education levels less than or equal to an associate's degree. However, among Bachelor's degree recipients, the odds of firearm and hand weapon victimization are significantly lower. Victimization risks for unarmed incidents display different dynamics. Higher odds of victimization are most evident at higher educational attainment levels. These patterns suggest that victimization processes involving firearms and hand weapons are more likely to reinforce educational inequality than processes involving unarmed victimization experiences.

Estimates in Table 3 convey very little variation in the odds of productivity interruptions by educational attainment. Estimates mostly show no significant difference in the odds of productivity interruptions for listed education levels relative to the reference group of high school graduates. There are two exceptions to this result. Respondents with less than a high school of education are 1.4 times more likely to report lost work time by a household member following a victimization experience ($p < 0.001$). This may be reflective of parents/guardians caring for victimized adolescents. Second, respondents who completed "some college" were 1.2 times more likely to report problems with work or school ($p < 0.001$). This may suggest that victimization is more likely to affect the continued schooling for those who are presently in pursuit of higher education.

Overall, higher odds of firearm and hand weapon victimization for persons with an Associate's degree or less, coupled with comparable odds of productivity interruptions across educational attainment levels suggests an inequality reinforcing effect of victimization incidents aggravated by firearms or hand weapons.

3.2.3   Race and Ethnicity

Risks of victimization differ significantly by respondent race and ethnicity. This is most evident in the Table 2 estimates for Asians, American Indians/Alaskans, and non-Hispanic respondents reporting multiple racial identities. Relative to the reference group of non-Hispanic whites, Asians face significantly lower odds of each type of victimization, while American Indians/Alaskans and multiracial non-Hispanics face significantly higher odds of firearm, hand weapon, and unarmed victimization. The magnitude of these differences are substantial with Asians being half as likely to experience some forms of victimization while American Indians and multiracial non-Hispanics can be nearly twice as likely to experience some forms of victimization.

Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks do not exhibit uniformly higher or lower risks of victimization relative to non-Hispanic whites. Instead, Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks face significantly higher risks of firearm victimization (2.1 times higher for non-Hispanic blacks ($p < 0.001$) and 1.2 times higher for Hispanics ($p < 0.001$)) and lower risks of unarmed victimization relative to non-Hispanic whites (0.8 times lower for non-Hispanic blacks ($p < 0.001$) and 0.7 times lower for Hispanics ($p < 0.001$)). Overall, estimates show that risk of victimization depend heavily upon race and ethnicity.

Results in Table 3 demonstrate racial and ethnic differences in the odds of losing work time and the odds of reporting problems with work or school, conditional upon experiencing victimization. Non-Hispanic blacks, American Indians/Alaskans, and Hispanics are 1.3 to 1.8 times more likely to lose work time following victimization than non-Hispanic whites. Similarly, American Indians/Alaskans, Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders, and multi-racial non-Hispanics are 1.4 to 2.4 times more likely to report problems at work or school following a victimization experience.

There is little evidence of widespread variation by race and ethnicity in the odds of lost work time by a household member. Hispanics face 1.2 times higher odds of work time interruptions for household members than non-Hispanic whites ($p < 0.05$). No other group exhibits significant differences along this dimension of productivity.

Estimates across both tables suggest that victimization processes can reinforce racial and ethnic inequality through productivity interruptions. Two of the most advantaged groups in this analysis—non-Hispanic whites and Asians—face some of the lowest odds of victimization and productivity interruptions. This implies that less advantaged groups bear more of the burden associated with victimization, lost work time, and problems with work or school.

3.2.4   Income

The odds ratios on income coefficients in Table 2 show that higher income has a protective effect that lowers the odds of victimization. Relative to the reference group of respondents earning \$35,000 or less per year, each increase in the earnings category is accompanied by a significant decrease in the odds of victimization. This demonstrates the inverse relationship between income and risk of victimization.

Estimates in Table 3 show differences in the odds of specific types of productivity interruptions. There appears to be no income gradient in the likelihood of lost work time for the victimized person. However, lost work time for a household member is more likely at the middle and high income categories. Conversely, the odds of reporting work or school problems are lower at high income levels. Results suggest that persons from high income households may be better able to manage victimization experiences without subsequent problems at work or school.

The income gradient in victimization risks coupled with higher odds of work and school interruptions among the lowest income subgroup suggest that victimization may have the inequality reinforcing effect of generating more professional and educational disruption among the lowest tier of earners.

3.3   Victimization and Productivity Interruptions Among Adolescents and Young Adults

While victimization can have negative effects at any point in the life course, there is a particular interest in understanding whether victimization experiences could have lasting effects on adolescents and young adults when incidents occur near critical life transitions. Of particular interest are (1) teenage years where youth are completing their secondary education and (2) young adult years that may coincide with college or entry into the labor market. Disruptions at either time point could be especially costly if they interrupt a transition in a way that negatively effects one's long-term trajectory.

Evidence from Table 2 shows that adolescents (age 12 to 18) and young adults (age 19 to 24) face some of the highest risk of hand weapon and unarmed victimization. Adolescents are 1.2 times more likely to be victimized with a hand weapon ($p < 0.001$) and 1.6 times more likely to experience unarmed victimization than the 25 to 40 year-old reference groups. Risks of firearm victimization are significantly lower for adolescents before peaking among young adults. High risks of victimization across younger age groups admit higher risks of highly consequential interruptions.

Results in Table 3 show that productivity interruptions from victimization experiences take different forms across the life course. Among adolescents, productivity interruptions are unlikely to present in the form of lost work time. Adolescents are 0.8 times less likely to report lost work time than the 25 to 40 year old reference group ($p < 0.001$). This likely reflects a lower labor force participation rate among adolescents, yielding less potential work time to lose.

Productivity losses for adolescents appear to be concentrated upon (1) work time losses for other members of their household, and (2) problems with work or school. Adolescents are 2.9 times more likely to report lost work time by a household member relative to the 25 to 40 year old reference group ($p < 0.001$). Adolescents are also 1.5 times more likely to report problems with work or school relative to the reference group ($p < 0.001$). Since work time interruptions are uncommon among this age group, reported problems are, likely, more reflective of schooling challenges that could have long-term consequences.

Productivity losses following victimization for young adults take a slightly different form. Victimization among 19 to 24 year-old respondents is more likely to result in lost work time than among adolescents, but less likely relative to the 25 to 40 year-old reference group. Victimization during young adulthood is 1.5 times more likely to lead to lost work time for a household member relative to the 25 to 40 year-old reference group ($p < 0.001$). Young adults are not more likely to report post-victimization problems with work or school than the reference age group.

Some of the highest age-graded risks of victimization are realized at adolescent and young adult ages. For adolescents, this leads to work disruptions for household members—most likely parents and legal guardians—as well as disruptions in schooling that could have long-term effects. For young adults, however, victimization leads to productivity losses in the form of lost work time for the victimized person and members of their household.

3.4   Victimization Rates and Trends Over Time

Figures 1 and 2 show time trends in the main independent and dependent variables after netting out effects of all control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3. Time trends in Figure 1 shows from approximately 1992 to 2006 with modest variation around comparable crime levels from 2006 to 2022.

Figure 2 also shows steady variation in lost work time for both the victimized person and a household member around a time consistent mean. This suggests that victimization experiences are becoming no more or less likely to produce work interruptions over time. This is in sharp contrast to the time trend for problems with work or school. From 2008 to 2022, reports of post-victimization problems with work or school have tripled. This poses a bit of a puzzle since there is no evidence of a motivating change in other time trends.

These patterns suggest that productivity losses from in the form of lost work time change very little over time, while the effects of work and school problems may have larger long-term effects that are difficult to fully characterize.

4   Conclusion

The central hypothesis of this work argues that violent victimization experiences lead to productivity interruptions that inhibit upward socioeconomic mobility and reinforce existing forms of inequality. Results from empirical analyses support this argument.

Violent crimes, victimization incidents involving firearms, and victimization incidents in-
volving hand weapons all lead to significantly higher odds of each type of productivity in-
terruption assessed (i.e, lost work time for the victim, lost work time for one of the victim's
household members, and reports of problems with work or school by the victim). Estimates
in Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence for this result. This establishes productivity interruptions
as one pathway linking victimization to mobility processes.

I find evidence of non-uniformity in the risks and/or results of victimization that reinforce
inequality by sex, education, race/ethnicity, and income. Table 2 estimates convey difference
in risks of victimization. These are sometimes compounded by differences in the odds of
productivity interruptions expressed in Table 3. Together, these results characterize the
ways in which victimization and its aftermath are more burdensome for specific segments of
the population.

Evidence for adolescent and young adult age groups reflects higher risks of specific forms of
victimization and age-contingent forms of productivity interruptions. Results for adolescents
(age 12 to 18) show high odds of lost work time for a household member and higher odds of
problems with work or school. Among young adults (age 19 to 24), the odds of lost work time
for a household member remain high and the odds of lost work time for the victim increases
relative to adolescents. These results demonstrate the changing effects of victimization over
younger stages of the life course.

This work is limited by its inability to link respondent reports of the selected types of pro-
ductivity interruptions to long-term social mobility outcomes. This is an implied limitation
of the three-year rotating panel design of the NCVS. This leaves no way to calculate declines
in lifetime earnings associated with lost work time, nor can we observe trajectory changes
associated with reported work and school problems.

The implications of an exogenous reduction in victimization incidents involving firearms
remain unclear. Some offenders may substitute a less lethal weapon in an attempt at a
similar crime. This could result in a lower risk of death with higher risk of serious injury
(Kleck and McElrath 1991). Others may not be willing to attempt certain crimes without
the leverage and benefits of a firearm. For example, the ability of a gun to threaten and gain
compliance from a distance could make some crimes possible that would be more difficult
with a hand weapon (Beauregard and Leclerc 2007). Some portion of these crimes would,
likely, not be attempted. While a shift away from firearms should offer the unambiguous
benefit of saving lives, implications for the productivity of survivors relative to competing
forms of victimization is unclear.

It is difficult to speculate concerning a full characterization of mobility differences between
an American context with high levels of gun violence versus peer countries with much lower
levels. It appears that victimization as a whole serves as a type of bad lottery draw that
is more likely to select the least advantaged, and can lead to a range of mobility challenges
ranging from the death of someone in your economic unit, to an inability to work, to changes
in one's educational trajectory. While such things happen in all settings, I speculate that
firearms have the effect of allowing victimization that may not be feasible without such
weaponry, making incidents more lethal, and concentrating the effects of both on specific

sub-populations. This creates an obstacle in the American context that does not exist in the same way in other settings.

References

Abbasi, J. and Y. Hswen, 2024. US Surgeon General Vivek Murthy: Firearm Violence Is a Public Health Crisis. *JAMA 332*(6), 439–441.

Beauregard, E. and B. Leclerc, 2007. An Application of the Rational Choice Approach to the Offending Process of Sex Offenders: A Closer Look at the Decision-Making. *Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 19*, 115–133.

Braga, A. A., E. Griffiths, K. Sheppard, and S. Douglas, 2021. Firearm Instrumentality: Do Guns Make Violent Situations More Lethal? *Annual Review of Criminology 4*(1), 147–164.

Burdick-Will, J., 2013. School Violent Crime and Academic Achievement in Chicago. *Sociology of education 86*(4), 343–361.

Burdick-Will, J., 2016. Neighborhood Violent Crime and Academic Growth in Chicago: Lasting Effects of Early Exposure. *Social forces 95*(1), 133–158.

Cook, P. J., 2018. Gun Markets. *Annual Review of Criminology 1*(1), 359–377.

Fry, D., X. Fang, S. Elliott, T. Casey, X. Zheng, J. Li, L. Florian, and G. McCluskey, 2018. The Relationships Between Violence in Childhood and Educational Outcomes: A Global Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. *Child abuse & neglect 75*, 6–28.

Kleck, G. and K. McElrath, 1991. The Effects of Weaponry on Human Violence. *Social forces 69*(3), 669–692.

Light, M. T. and C. T. Harris, 2012. Race, Space, and Violence: Exploring Spatial Dependence in Structural Covariates of White and Black Violent Crime in US Counties. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology 28*, 559–586.

Macmillan, R., 2001. Violence and the Life Course: The Consequences of Victimization for Personal and Social Development. *Annual review of sociology 27*(1), 1–22.

Richardson, E. G. and D. Hemenway, 2011. Homicide, Suicide, and Unintentional Firearm Fatality: Comparing the United States with Other High-Income Countries, 2003. *Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 70*(1), 238–243.

Sampson, R. J., J. D. Morenoff, and T. Gannon-Rowley, 2002. Assessing "Neighborhood Effects": Social Processes and New Directions in Research. *Annual review of sociology 28*(1), 443–478.

Sharkey, P., 2008. The Intergenerational Transmission of Context. *American Journal of Sociology 113*(4), 931–969.

Sharkey, P., 2010. The Acute Effect of Local Homicides on Children's Cognitive Performance. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107*(26), 11733–11738.

Sharkey, P., 2018. *Uneasy Peace: The Great Crime Decline, the Renewal of City Life, and the Next War on Violence*. WW Norton & Company.
and the Reinforcement of Social Inequality

Sharkey, P. and G. Torrats-Espinosa, 2017. The Effect of Violent Crime on Economic Mobility. *Journal of Urban Economics 102*, 22–33.

Appendix of Tables and Figures

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample versus Sample Victimized with Known Type of Weapon, NCVS 1992-2022**

Variable	Full Sample	Victimized
Independent Variables		
Any Victimization	0.130	1.000
Violent Crime	0.026	0.686
Firearm Victimization	0.003	0.084
Hand Weapon Victimization	0.005	0.139
Unarmed Victimization	0.032	0.832
Dependent Variables		
Victim lost work time (0-6m)	n/a	0.029
Household member lost work time (0-6m)	n/a	0.022
Victim reports work/school problems (0-6m)	n/a	0.091
Control Variables		
$12 \leq$ Age ≤ 18	0.119	0.501
$19 \leq$ Age ≤ 24	0.137	0.193
$25 \leq$ Age ≤ 40	0.298	0.187
$41 \leq$ Age ≤ 60	0.271	0.311
$60 <$ Age	0.185	0.232
Female	0.510	0.086
Never Married	0.386	0.520
Married	0.441	0.270
Separated	0.023	0.045
Widowed	0.052	0.031
Divorced	0.093	0.132

Note: Dependent variable measures are only available for the victimized sample. The victimized sample only includes respondents who reported a victimization experience involving a firearm, hand weapon, or unarmed assailant. Victimization incidents with no information about the type of weapon employed are omitted from the victimized sample.

(Table continued from previous page.)

Variable	Full Sample	Victimized
Control Variables (continued)		
Edu.: < High School	0.327	0.400
Edu.: High School	0.174	0.137
Edu.: Some College	0.264	0.305
Edu.: Associate's	0.046	0.040
Edu.: Bachelors	0.114	0.073
Edu.: Graduate/Prof.	0.056	0.037
Race/Ethnicity: White, non-Hispanic	0.664	0.672
Race/Ethnicity: Black, non-Hispanic	0.129	0.146
Race/Ethnicity: American Indian/Alaskan	0.006	0.011
Race/Ethnicity: Asian	0.046	0.014
Race/Ethnicity: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	0.002	0.001
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic	0.143	0.128
Race/Ethnicity: Multiple, non-Hispanic	0.009	0.016
Current Military	0.008	0.007
HH Income: <$30,000	0.348	0.454
HH Income: $35,000 - $74,999	0.278	0.265
HH Income: >$100,000	0.227	0.169
HH Income: Unknown	0.147	0.112
Personal Theft	0.005	0.132
Weighted N	1,596,792	59,912

Note: Dependent variable measures are only available for the victimized sample. The victimized sample only includes respondents who reported a victimization experience involving a firearm, hand weapon, or unarmed assailant. Victimization incidents with no information about the type of weapon employed are omitted from the victimized sample.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Modeling the Risk of Victimization Involving a Firearm, Hand Weapon, or Unarmed Assailant, NCVS 1992-2022

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Female	0.527***	0.574***	1.072***
	(0.0170)	(0.0140)	(0.0110)
$12 \leq$ Age ≤ 18	0.696***	1.228***	1.568***
	(0.0450)	(0.0560)	(0.0310)
$19 \leq$ Age ≤ 24	1.230***	1.263***	1.128***
	(0.0590)	(0.0500)	(0.0200)
$25 \leq$ Age ≤ 40	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
$41 \leq$ Age ≤ 60	0.761***	0.834***	0.905***
	(0.0320)	(0.0280)	(0.0120)
$60 <$ Age	0.340***	0.299***	0.511***
	(0.0240)	(0.0180)	(0.0100)
Never Married	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Married	0.632***	0.562***	0.612***
	(0.0290)	(0.0210)	(0.0090)
Separated	1.453***	1.861***	1.808***
	(0.1150)	(0.1120)	(0.0480)
Widowed	0.738*	0.801*	0.867***
	(0.0920)	(0.0760)	(0.0270)
Divorced	1.317***	1.452***	1.397***
	(0.0740)	(0.0650)	(0.0260)

Note: $†p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Edu.: < High School	1.0460 (0.0620)	1.0780 (0.0500)	1.033† (0.0200)
Edu.: High School	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Edu.: Some College	0.939 (0.0550)	1.017 (0.0460)	1.213*** (0.0220)
Edu.: Associate's	0.9030 (0.0850)	1.139† (0.0820)	1.283*** (0.0360)
Edu.: Bachelors	0.786** (0.0610)	0.810*** (0.0510)	1.034 (0.0230)
Edu.: Graduate/Prof.	0.825† (0.0910)	0.958 (0.0790)	1.280*** (0.0350)

Note: $†p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Race/Ethnicity: White, non-Hispanic	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Race/Ethnicity: Black, non-Hispanic	2.061***	1.014	0.842***
	(0.0830)	(0.0380)	(0.0140)
Race/Ethnicity: American Indian/Alaskan	1.862***	1.938***	1.650***
	(0.2730)	(0.1990)	(0.0830)
Race/Ethnicity: Asian	0.756**	0.549***	0.476***
	(0.0760)	(0.0450)	(0.0160)
Race/Ethnicity: Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander	0.678	0.681	0.782†
	(0.3670)	(0.2200)	(0.1010)
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic	1.293***	0.949	0.739***
	(0.0590)	(0.0350)	(0.0120)
Race/Ethnicity: Multiple, non-Hispanic	1.837***	2.136***	1.778***
	(0.2760)	(0.2130)	(0.0770)
Military Experience	0.727*	0.921	0.836**
	(0.1160)	(0.1110)	(0.0480)
HH Income: < $35,000	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
HH Income: $35,000 - $74,999	0.794***	0.782***	0.811***
	(0.0320)	(0.0240)	(0.0100)
HH Income: > $75,000	0.661***	0.645***	0.741***
	(0.0360)	(0.0260)	(0.0120)
HH Income: Missing	0.690***	0.608***	0.613***
	(0.0360)	(0.0260)	(0.0110)

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 1992	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Year 1993	1.666***	1.163	1.348***
	(0.2170)	(0.1110)	(0.0620)
Year 1994	2.290***	1.374***	1.770***
	(0.2740)	(0.1200)	(0.0720)
Year 1995	1.998***	1.358***	1.723***
	(0.2290)	(0.1100)	(0.0660)
Year 1996	0.886	0.752**	0.887**
	(0.1220)	(0.0730)	(0.0400)
Year 1997	1.629***	1.109	1.357***
	(0.2130)	(0.1050)	(0.0600)
Year 1998	1.645***	1.198†	1.681***
	(0.2110)	(0.1110)	(0.0720)
Year 1999	1.452**	1.199†	1.611***
	(0.1900)	(0.1110)	(0.0690)
Year 2000	1.197	1.075	1.421***
	(0.1600)	(0.1020)	(0.0620)
Year 2001	1.155	0.996	1.232***
	(0.1590)	(0.0970)	(0.0550)
Year 2002	1.071	0.839†	1.201***
	(0.1500)	(0.0850)	(0.0550)
Year 2003	0.95	0.808*	1.147**
	(0.1430)	(0.0850)	(0.0540)

Note: $\dagger p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 2004	0.837	0.816†	1.114*
	(0.1290)	(0.0870)	(0.0520)
Year 2005	0.789†	0.688***	0.962
	(0.1090)	(0.0670)	(0.0420)
Year 2006	0.757†	0.492***	0.651***
	(0.1250)	(0.0620)	(0.0360)
Year 2007	0.684*	0.668***	0.999
	(0.1080)	(0.0730)	(0.0480)
Year 2008	0.77	0.730**	1.177***
	(0.1270)	(0.0840)	(0.0580)
Year 2009	1.031	0.600***	1.188***
	(0.1570)	(0.0740)	(0.0590)
Year 2010	0.895	0.625***	1.192***
	(0.1410)	(0.0750)	(0.0580)
Year 2011	0.989	0.634***	1.182***
	(0.1490)	(0.0750)	(0.0570)
Year 2012	0.927	0.707**	1.229***
	(0.1390)	(0.0780)	(0.0570)
Year 2013	0.705*	0.535***	1.255***
	(0.1130)	(0.0630)	(0.0590)

Note: $†p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Firearm Victimization	Hand Weapon	Victimized by unarmed offender
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 2014	0.91	0.635***	1.139**
	(0.1370)	(0.0730)	(0.0540)
Year 2015	0.660*	0.476***	0.999
	(0.1100)	(0.0620)	(0.0510)
Year 2016	0.674**	0.478***	0.844***
	(0.1020)	(0.0540)	(0.0400)
Year 2017	0.725*	0.560***	0.821***
	(0.1150)	(0.0640)	(0.0400)
Year 2018	0.796	0.564***	0.934
	(0.1240)	(0.0640)	(0.0440)
Year 2019	0.951	0.564***	0.96
	(0.1410)	(0.0620)	(0.0450)
Year 2020	0.918	0.561***	0.954
	(0.1450)	(0.0640)	(0.0460)
Year 2021	0.812	0.508***	0.799***
	(0.1210)	(0.0600)	(0.0390)
Year 2022	0.796†	0.586***	0.771***
	(0.1050)	(0.0560)	(0.0330)
Cons.	0.006***	0.014***	0.039***
	(0.0007)	(0.0012)	(0.0016)
Model Degrees of Freedom	54	54	54
Pseudo R-squared	0.051	0.052	0.040
Log Likelihood	-49,217,588.6	-75,170,150.8	-323,174,039.7
N	1,584,861	1,584,861	1,584,861

Note: $†p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

Table 3: Logistic Regression Modeling the Odds of Productivity Interruptions Following Victimization as a Function of Respondent and Incident Characteristics, NCVS 1992-2022

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Violent Crime	8.485***	1.754***	11.26***
	(1.107)	(0.150)	(1.289)
Property Crime	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Firearm	1.244**	1.528***	1.395***
	(0.1019)	(0.1502)	(0.1188)
Hand Weapon	2.210***	1.618***	1.418***
	(0.1352)	(0.1306)	(0.0989)
Unarmed	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Female	1.259***	1.751***	1.902***
	(0.0693)	(0.1165)	(0.1073)
$12 \leq \text{Age} \leq 18$	0.204***	2.889***	1.482***
	(0.0284)	(0.3267)	(0.1559)
$19 \leq \text{Age} \leq 24$	0.780**	1.457***	0.961
	(0.0610)	(0.1518)	(0.0840)
$25 \leq \text{Age} \leq 40$	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
$41 \leq \text{Age} \leq 60$	0.800**	0.778**	0.981
	(0.0564)	(0.0715)	(0.0675)
$60 < \text{Age}$	0.318***	0.334***	0.527***
	(0.0528)	(0.0691)	(0.0607)

Note: $\dagger p < .1$; $*p < .05$; $**p < .01$; $***p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

<center>*(Table continued from previous page.)*</center>

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Never Married	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Married	0.838*	2.438***	0.675***
	(0.0651)	(0.2333)	(0.0546)
Widowed	0.972	0.742	0.857
	(0.2134)	(0.2567)	(0.1532)
Separated	1.163	0.848	1.101
	(0.1329)	(0.1715)	(0.1339)
Divorced	1.307**	1.037	1.185*
	(0.1099)	(0.1427)	(0.0994)
Edu.: < High School	0.921	1.439**	1.011
	(0.0937)	(0.1790)	(0.0901)
Edu.: High School	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Edu.: Some College	0.893	1.065	1.222**
	(0.0839)	(0.1328)	(0.0941)
Edu.: Associate's Degree	0.937	1.21	1.082
	(0.1347)	(0.2279)	(0.1138)
Edu.: Bachelor's Degree	0.835	0.832	0.885
	(0.1049)	(0.1510)	(0.0845)
Edu.: Graduate/Professional Degree	0.895	0.689	0.964
	(0.1487)	(0.1648)	(0.1196)

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Race/Ethnicity: White, non-Hispanic	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Race/Ethnicity: Black, non-Hispanic	1.396*** (0.1103)	0.909 (0.0933)	1.053 (0.0860)
Race/Ethnicity: American Indian/Alaskan	1.763** (0.3510)	1.319 (0.3301)	1.844** (0.4007)
Race/Ethnicity: Asian	1.055 (0.1958)	0.988 (0.2092)	0.808 (0.1486)
Race/Ethnicity: Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	0.633 (0.5186)		2.368* (0.8890)
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic	1.341*** (0.1042)	1.261* (0.1148)	1.090 (0.0812)
Race/Ethnicity: Multiple, non-Hispanic	1.383 (0.2788)	1.191 (0.3465)	1.462** (0.2099)
Military Experience	0.697 (0.2286)	0.563 (0.2419)	1.010 (0.2876)
HH Income: < $35,000	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
HH Income: $35,000 - $74,999	0.994 (0.0691)	1.293** (0.1018)	0.850* (0.0581)
HH Income: > $75,000	0.97 (0.0901)	1.460*** (0.1420)	0.831* (0.0663)
HH Income: Missing	1.1020 (0.0984)	1.0820 (0.1205)	0.9640 (0.1002)

Note: $\dagger p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 1992	1.428 (0.4011)	0.989 (0.3033)	
Year 1993	1.416 (0.3623)	0.978 (0.2752)	
Year 1994	1.385 (0.3295)	0.882 (0.2202)	
Year 1995	1.091 (0.2527)	0.995 (0.2356)	
Year 1996	1.392 (0.3607)	0.818 (0.2276)	
Year 1997	1.159 (0.2986)	0.774 (0.2120)	
Year 1998	1.305 (0.3240)	0.957 (0.2459)	
Year 1999	1.218 (0.3117)	1.068 (0.2787)	
Year 2000	1.257 (0.3227)	0.99 (0.2649)	
Year 2001	1.251 (0.3214)	1.102 (0.2907)	
Year 2002	1.632† (0.4134)	1.324 (0.3480)	
Year 2003	1.694* (0.4241)	1.082 (0.3077)	
Year 2004	1.263 (0.3344)	1.032 (0.2920)	

(Table continued from previous page.)

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 2005	1.313	0.929	
	(0.3229)	(0.2482)	
Year 2006	1.807*	1.788†	
	(0.5090)	(0.5345)	
Year 2007	1.352	1.25	
	(0.3622)	(0.3566)	
Year 2008	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Year 2009	1.297	0.739	1.706*
	(0.3600)	(0.2459)	(0.4623)
Year 2010	1.262	0.923	2.187**
	(0.3479)	(0.2971)	(0.5772)
Year 2011	1.335	0.996	2.837***
	(0.3673)	(0.2995)	(0.7387)
Year 2012	1.407	1.251	2.944***
	(0.3653)	(0.3549)	(0.7549)
Year 2013	1.172	0.9	2.713***
	(0.3165)	(0.2841)	(0.7005)
Year 2014	1.698*	1.065	2.738***
	(0.4402)	(0.3278)	(0.7111)
Year 2015	1.071	1.212	2.620***
	(0.3250)	(0.4108)	(0.7005)
Year 2016	1.101	0.929	2.770***
	(0.3019)	(0.2804)	(0.7191)

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

(Table continued from previous page.)

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)	O.R./(S.E.)
Year 2017	1.041	1.111	3.338***
	(0.2966)	(0.3411)	(0.8681)
Year 2018	1.047	0.796	3.358***
	(0.2925)	(0.2715)	(0.8643)
Year 2019	1.358	0.978	2.848***
	(0.3547)	(0.2924)	(0.7337)
Year 2020	1.202	1.203	2.773***
	(0.3326)	(0.3608)	(0.7261)
Year 2021	1.136	1.065	2.674***
	(0.3222)	(0.3604)	(0.7048)
Year 2022	1.147	0.7	3.289***
	(0.2768)	(0.2070)	(0.8192)
Cons.	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)
Model Degrees of Freedom	57	56	41
Pseudo R-squared	0.100	0.063	0.126
Log Likelihood	-10,856,799.8	-9,081,458.9	-9,686,161.0
N	59,710	59,623	23,925

Note: †$p < .1$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-sided tests). Ref = Reference group. O.R. = Odds ratio. S.E. = Standard error.

Table 4: Percentage of Victimized Respondents Reporting Productivity Interruptions within Six Months of their Victimization Experience by Type of Crime and Type of Weapon Involved

	Vic. Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	HH Member Lost Work Time 0 - 6m	Vic. Reports Work/Sch. Prob. Time 0 - 6m
Ref., Property Crime, Unarmed	0.40%	0.40%	0.30%
Ref., Violent, Unarmed	3.28%	0.70%	3.27%
Ref., Violent, Hand Weapon	6.98%	1.12%	4.57%
Ref., Violent, Firearm	4.05%	1.06%	4.50%

Note: Probabilities of productivity interruptions were calculated from odds ratio estimates in Table 3. Probabilities were calculated by taking the product of the constant term and odds ratio estimates for the specified conditions. This product, s, was then converted to a probability, p, according to $p = \frac{s}{1+s}$. Estimates pertain to a reference respondent who is a 25- to 40- year-old never-married non-Hispanic white male who completed high school, has no military experience, and earns less than $35,000 per year.

Figure 1: Proportion of Sample Reporting Victimization involving Firearms, Hand Weapons, or Unarmed Assailants, 1992-2022


Figure 2: Proportion of Victimized Sample Reporting Productivity Interruptions Following a Victimization Experience, 1992-2022

Note: Figure shows productivity losses for a base case of unarmed property crime. Estimates pertain to a reference respondent who is a 25- to 40- year-old never-married non-Hispanic white male who completed high school, has no military experience, and earns less than $35,000 per year.