

Lindsay Jacobs
University of
Wisconsin–Madison

Occupations and Work at Older Ages: Varied Responses to Policy

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement and Disability Consortium. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the Federal Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the contents of this report. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof.

Center for Financial Security

University of
Wisconsin-Madison

1300 Linden Drive
Madison, WI 53706

608-890-0229
cfs@mailplus.wisc.edu
cfs.wisc.edu

Abstract

There are a number of differences between individuals in “blue-collar” and “white-collar” occupations in the timing of retirement, savings, Social Security OASI claiming ages, and SSDI applications. This paper presents descriptive evidence of these differences and develops and estimates the parameters of a model of later-life labor supply, savings, and Social Security OASDI behavior. The model accounts for a number of differences across blue- and white-collar workers in particular and is then used to predict behavior and measure welfare under the counterfactual policy scenarios of increases in the Early Retirement and Full Retirement Ages for claiming Social Security benefits. I find that increasing the Early Retirement Age has large labor supply and disutility effects for blue-collar workers, and results in greater SSDI application for this group. This is driven primarily by those in blue-collar occupations experiencing more steeply declining productivity with age and less margin on which to respond to policy changes. Increasing the Full Retirement Age affects the labor supply of white-collar but not blue-collar workers. It does, however, increase the savings somewhat for the latter group.

1 Introduction

Increases in average life expectancy, improved health in older ages, and work becoming less physically demanding have all contributed to a greater number of working years and postponed retirement. However, this is not uniformly the experienced across the population, as there are many patterns across occupations in the timing of retirement, disability rates, and OASI claiming behavior. Compared to people who have worked in less physically intense “white-collar” jobs, in the Health and Retirement Study sample studied in this paper, those in “blue-collar” jobs where more physical input is required tend to retire earlier, save less, claim Social Security OASI benefits earlier. They are also more likely to apply for and receive SSDI benefits; this is the case even controlling for income.¹

Sharp increases in life expectancy coupled with the “pay-as-you-go” design of Social Security OASI have led to the program facing projected deficits in the coming decades.² To improve the solvency of the program, increases to the Full Retirement Age (FRA) for claiming OASI benefits have already been implemented. Further increasing the FRA—or even the Early Retirement Age (ERA)—is one conceivable way of ensuring the program’s continued solvency. A person can respond to increases in these claiming ages by saving more before leaving work to fund more non-work years before claiming FRA, claiming early and reduced benefits, and working longer. Because of differences in productivity and labor supply patterns at older ages for people in blue-collar and white-collar occupations, however, we might expect the response to this policy change to differ among these groups.

This paper takes a life-cycle perspective to study how the interactions among labor supply decisions, health, and OASDI vary across occupations through both descriptive statistics and structural econometric methods. The descriptive component uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and O*NET data on occupational tasks to capture patterns in labor supply, saving, and OASDI program behavior for two broadly defined occupations. These features of the data motivate a dynamic model of decision making in later life. The structural analysis component involves finding the parameters of the model that allow simulated agents to most closely replicate the behavior of real people observed in the data.

By constructing a parameterized model of behavior, we can estimate what behavior would look like under counterfactual scenarios and policies and decompose the channels through which declines in health affect the decisions of a heterogeneous set of individuals—decisions which constitute any larger trends of interest. Predicting responses to policies that have not yet been implemented cannot be readily accomplished through non-structural methods, which are better equipped to assess responses to existing policies. The counterfactual policies addressed in this paper are increases to the OASI ERA, which is currently 62, and the FRA, which is between 65–67 depending on one’s year of birth) The simulated behavior of interest under these scenarios are (1) differences between people in blue-collar and white-collar jobs in

¹This is shown in Figure 2 and Table 3.

²See Figure II.D5 from the 2019 OASDI Trustees Report (U.S. Social Security Administration Board of Trustees, 2019), which shows unfunded obligations as the cumulative OASDI expenditures exceed income beginning in year 2035.

the labor supply and utility responses to changes in the claiming ages, and (2) the interaction between increases in claiming ages and SSDI applications in different occupations.

2 Related Work

This work aims to address three distinct but interrelated questions, all taking a dynamic, life-cycle approach emphasizing the role of occupations in later-life labor supply and the impact of Social Security OASI and DI. Accordingly, the literature this study builds on falls under three broad topic categories.

The first set of literature looks primarily at labor supply and utility responses to changes in the OASI claiming age structure, including Behaghel and Blau (2012), Gustman and Steinmeier (2015), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), and Staubli and Zweimuller (2013). Because the emphasis in this paper is how these responses vary by occupation, I will incorporate literature on the capacity to work at older ages (Coile and Milligan (2017) and Cutler et al. (2013)) as well as work on later-life occupational differences in productivity (Chirikos and Nestel (1991), Hayward et al. (1989), Hirsch et al. (2000), and Modrek and Cullen (2012)). My aim is to enhance existing research by measuring the variation in effects across the population by studying the welfare effects of the existing increases in OASI claiming ages and predicting how labor supply changes in response for people across occupations,

Several papers, including Rust and Phelan (1997), have noted and sought to explain through structural models the large spike in both retirement from work and OASI claims at age 62. I find that this is ERA claiming is especially common for blue-collar (BC) workers. Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) explain this through time preferences. However, another aspect when considering occupations as in this paper is that BC workers, even with the same time preferences, face more steeply declining productivity (which is captured here).

In studying work SSDI utilization across broad occupations among people at older ages, this component will additionally draw on past work looking at the role of occupation in the dynamics of health and working behavior (Hudomiet et al. (2018), Engelman and Jackson (2015), and Rutledge et al. (2017)). Methodologically, this work will model older-age dynamic decisions similarly to French (2005) and French and Jones (2011), with the added dimension of occupations and disability.

Through the simulated counterfactual policy, I predict what the effects within the model will be on SSDI utilization for people in different occupations in response to changes in the OASI claiming age. One hypothesis of this paper is that while the aggregate change in DI utilization may be small, the response is potentially significant for those in more physically intense, blue-collar jobs. Because productivity in their work declines on average more quickly with age, they are less able to bridge the gap between when they otherwise would have stopped working and the new, higher ERA and FRA by working more years. Because that channel is less feasible for them, DI looks even more attractive to those blue-collar workers compared to white-collar workers. Many researchers have studied the interaction between the

OASI FRA and SSDI, including Coe and Haverstick (2010), Duggan et al. (2007) and Li and Maestas (2008). This study is novel in both focusing on the differential interaction effect over occupations using structural modeling methods to address the question. With this approach we can estimate the the relative magnitude of effects and identify the mechanisms through which responses vary for people in different occupations. Clarifying these mechanisms may inform design of policy and expectations about how well policy changes are received among different populations.

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The primary data source here is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a biennial panel dataset of Americans over age 50, with rich information on health, savings and income, work, program participation, family, and many other factors. Its panel aspect is useful particularly for the understanding the dynamic processes of health, savings, and labor supply decisions central to the work proposed in this study. I also make use of the restricted-access variables on detailed occupations and Social Security earnings records to calculate expected OASI and SSDI benefits. The detailed occupations are then linked with O*NET data on occupational tasks to separate occupations into more physically intense, *blue-collar*, and less physically intense, *white-collar* occupations. In particular, through linking the detailed occupational data in the HRS to O*NET, I can create an indexed measure of the degree to which physical input is required for an occupation, which is a primary dimension along which retirement timing and OASDI program participation vary.³

The subset of the HRS respondents studied here includes 5,631 males born between 1924–1947, observed ages 44–90 between 1992 and 2014.⁴ Nearly all respondents are observed for more than one interview or wave of the data, resulting in 45,866 person-years, with an average age of 65.5 when surveyed. Table 1 gives a summary of of some characteristics of the sample.

The main focus of this paper, and what the modelling seeks to explain, is the many outcomes the differ for those in blue-collar and white-collar work. These include differences in labor supply at older ages, the timing of OASI claiming, savings behavior, and rates of disability.

To begin with the labor supply differences, the HRS interviews, for the majority of the

³More details on the method for categorizing occupations into *blue-collar* and *white-collar* can be found in Jacobs (2016).

⁴The rationale behind restricting the sample to males has two related rationales. The first is that, when estimating a model of behavior, the more similar the individuals are in preferences, the more precisely the model can be estimated. Men and women, especially of the birth-year cohorts analyzed here, have very different labor supply patterns, suggesting that their preferences might differ enough to justify separate models of decision making or joint household decisions with bargaining, for instance (e.g., Cassanova 2014). A related reason is that a large enough portion of married males have spouses who are not working when first observed in the HRS data, making the male respondent's decisions in essence a household decision. Of those who are married, 54.3% have a spouse working FT when first observed (and are excluded from the parameter estimation).

Table 1: *HRS Sample Respondents*

Variable:	
Sample Size	5,631
Person-Years	45,866
Birth Years	1924–47
Average Age Observed in HRS	65.5
Marital Status (first observed)	84.6%
If married, % Spouse Working	54.3%
Occupation	53.3% BC, 46.7% WC
Education Category	
<i>Less than HS</i>	23.4%
<i>HS or GED</i>	35.5
<i>Some College</i>	19.6
<i>College and Above</i>	21.5

sample respondents, span both working and entry into retirement, given the average age at interview of 65.5. Figure 1 presents labor force behavior of the sample by broadly defined occupation. Overall, labor force participation, defined as “working for pay” at the time of the interview (as well as reporting positive earnings and working for more than five hours per week), declines rapidly from age 60 on. Also striking is the difference in work behavior between those in blue-collar and white-collar jobs. For all ages, the percent of those working whose career is in blue-collar work is lower at all ages, and by age 66, for instance, those in white-collar occupations are about 50 percent more likely to be working for pay compared to those in blue-collar jobs (around 45 versus 30 percent).⁵ While some of this difference in work behavior is due to earnings levels across the occupations (those with lower earnings levels have somewhat earlier retirement regardless of job type), what will be analyzed here is the extent to which this is driven by more steeply declining productivity in blue-collar work, as well as potentially greater disutility from working in blue-collar jobs with age or poor health.

Another way in which those in BC versus WC jobs differ is in their timing of Social Security OASI benefits. The *Early Retirement Age* (ERA) is 62 for all birth years, while the *Normal* or *Full Retirement Age* (FRA) is exactly 65 for much of the sample (born before 1938) and between 65 and 66 for those with later birth years.⁶ Monthly benefits—the *primary insurance amount* or PIA—are determined based on earnings histories and are relative to the FRA. The PIA is lower the earlier one claims. Figure 2 presents the OASI behavior of the sample by occupation and earnings. Claiming at the earliest age possible is more common for those in blue-collar jobs, where as claiming at the FRA is significantly more

⁵Also, while not shown in this graph, of those who are working at all, the share who report working part-time hours increases from about 5 percent at age 50 to well over half working part-time beyond age 70. The proportion of those who are working part-time is roughly the same across occupations.

⁶Please see Appendix B for more discussion of claiming ages and how benefits are calculated.

common for white-collar workers. This may be for a number of reasons, including liquidity constraints, differences in risk aversion or patience levels, earnings paths, disutility from work with age, and mortality expectations—all of which would have slightly different implications for counterfactual policies and with many being of primary interest here.

Another difference to note among those whose work is in blue- versus white-collar jobs is the difference in assets held. Overall, even controlling for typical income, those working in white-collar jobs have significantly higher levels of savings. Table 2 specifically presents the savings behavior of the sample by occupation and earnings. As is typical for measures of wealth, the distribution is highly skewed, leading to the mean being much greater than the median. With BC workers in the upper and WC workers in the lower panel, the table shows the mean, median, and median level relative to typical income of non-housing financial assets when aged 55-59. It is divided up by typical income quintiles over all sample respondents, which is determined by annual income from work while observed as a respondent in the HRS while ages 50-59. Focusing on the middle (Third) quintile, for instance, despite blue- and white-collar workers having the same range of typical income, mean financial assets are about \$71K versus \$96K, and the median assets similarly differ at \$17K versus \$29K. These differences conditional on income suggest that there may perhaps be very different average time preferences, levels of risk aversion, or other preferences across the two groups.

Another aspect of the data which differs between those in different broad occupations is in limitations to work due to health as well as SSDI application and receipt. Table 3 shows these patterns. For a given age, BC workers are far more likely to say that their health limits their work. In the first row of the table we see that among those ages 55-59, 27.3 percent of BC workers say that their health limits their work compared to 15.5 percent of WC workers, which is significant considering there is not a large difference in levels of health between the groups. Furthermore, the health limitation is more likely to prohibit work altogether for BC

Table 2: *Savings Behavior*

Non-Housing Assets (quintile mean ages 55-59)			
	Asset Mean (\$)	Asset Median (\$)	Rel. to Income
BC:			
Lowest Fifth	\$16,998 (80,598)	\$30	0.00
Second	32,875 (107,581)	5,932	0.16
Third	71,114 (267,071)	16,949	0.32
Fourth	88,607 (173,630)	33,333	0.45
Highest Fifth	146,572 (659,363)	29,710	0.28
WC:			
Lowest Fifth	81,308 (236,860)	11,276	0.61
Second	77,319 (278,478)	11,111	0.28
Third	96,203 (371,696)	28,813	0.54
Fourth	232,707 (1,390,846)	50,741	0.67
Highest Fifth	455,927 (1,987,947)	111,818	0.80

Figure 1: *Labor Force Status by Age*




Figure 2 Description: This graph shows the percent of the sample who are working either full-time or part-time by age (55–81), for by those in blue-collar and white-collar jobs, and includes 45,866 person-years. While the share working fall with age for those in both occupations, the share working is relatively high for white-collar workers, especially at older ages .

Figure 2: *OASI Benefit Claiming Age*




Figure 2 Description: This figure shows the share who claim Social Security OASI benefits at each age for both blue- and white-collar workers. In this sample, for people in both occupations there are spikes at ages 62 and 65—the ERA and FRA for most of the respondents. For blue-collar workers especially, claiming at the ERA is more common, while for white-collar workers, claiming at the FRA is more common relative to blue-collar workers.

Table 3: *SSDI Behavior*

SSDI Claiming	BC	WC
Health limits work (ages 55-59)	27.3%	15.5%
<i>Working with health limitation</i>	33.7%	45.6%
SSDI Application Ever	24.8%	10.6%
Current SSDI Receipt, ages 60–64	12.1%	4.9%

workers, as only about 34 percent work despite the presence of a health limitation compared to the 46 percent of WC workers who remain in work.

The same differences in health limitations to work also translate to differences in SSDI application and receipt. Nearly a quarter of the sample with a blue-collar occupation have applied for SSDI compared to under 11 percent of those in white-collar occupations.⁷ At the time the respondents were age 60–64, about 12 percent of BC workers and 5 percent of WC workers were receiving SSDI benefits. While some of these differences may arise due to SSDI benefits looking relatively more attractive to BC workers, who have somewhat lower earnings overall, the effect, though diminished, remains when controlling for income. In any case, taking into account the differences between these occupations could be useful for projecting SSDI trends into the future or more precisely the effects of policy changes.

4 A Model of Work and Social Security Choices

This section presents a model of behavior in which individuals—who may be in either blue-collar or white-collar occupations—make annual choices about work, savings, Social Security OASI claiming and DI applications. Individuals will differ in number of ways, in both state variables and preferences. After estimating the parameters of this model, the model will be used to measure welfare changes and generate simulated behavior under counterfactual policy scenarios.

⁷This does not mean that only fewer than 50 percent of the SSDI applications were successful, as those who are observed in the HRS during ages 60–64 are selected on having survived to that age, which is less likely for someone receiving SSDI.

4.1 The Individual's Problem: Occupation, Labor Supply, Savings, and Social Security Application Decisions

In this model, each individual begins making decisions annual from age 50 on, with a broad occupation they will remain in while working⁸, an income history, and health status. Every annual period t , agents make decisions about:

- Current-period labor supply: Agents may choose to work either part- or full-time if working. This is a modest simplification based on the observation that observed hours worked tend to be clustered around 1,000 and 2,000 hours annually. Participation is notated as $p_t \in \{0, PT, FT\}$.
- Consumption that period, c_t . This is by definition also the savings decision, with $c_t \leq A_t + y_t$, where A_t represents assets and y_t income in period t . Additionally consumption must be at least as great as a consumption floor so that $g_t \leq c_t$. These constraints are imposed to reflect the presumed difficulty in obtaining uncollateralized loans at older ages, given the uncertain stream of income and there being no possibility of garnishing an individual's Social Security benefit payments.
- Whether to begin receiving OASI, if ages 62-70: $OASI_t^{app} \in \{0, 1\}$. OASI benefits depend on past contributions (a proportion of historical earnings) and the age benefits are claimed.
- Whether to apply for SSDI if under normal retirement age: $DI_t^{app} \in \{0, 1\}$, which is received with some probability $p(DI_t^{rec}|DI_t^{app}, OCC_t, d_t) < 1$ that depends on occupation and health status, OCC_t and d_t , respectively (described below).

These decisions are summarized as $\mathcal{D}_t = \{p_t, c_t, OASI_t^{app}, DI_t^{app}\}$. All of these decisions are made given the known state space for that period. The state variables are:

- Asset level, A_t , which includes all non-housing financial assets including pension estimates.
- Current income, y_t (varies by whether working part- or full-time).
- Current health status. This includes both overall, self reported, $h_t \in \{good, bad\}$, and disability, as measured by existence functional limitation, $d_t \in \{0, 1\}$.
- OASI and SSDI status, which is whether already began receiving in the past or not: $OASI_{t-1}^{rec} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $DI_{t-1}^{rec} \in \{0, 1\}$ as well as Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, $AIME_t$, which is a function of past earnings and determines the OASI and SSDI benefit level for an individual.
- Occupation, $OCC_t \in \{BC, WC\}$.

Vector $\mathcal{S}_t = \{A_t, y_t, h_t, d_t, OASI_{t-1}^{rec}, DI_{t-1}^{rec}, AIME_t, OCC_t\}$ represents the state space at period t . Agents make these decisions with uncertainty over a number of state variables looking

⁸In Jacobs (2016), I consider the selection of occupation taking into account differences in later-life productivity, arguing that both the presence of DI and heterogeneous risk aversion levels matter for the early occupation choice, savings, labor supply decisions.

forward, knowing the distribution but not the future outcome. These are:

- Future health, including overall and functional limitations (disability), h_{t+1} and d_{t+1} . Both of these are a function of current health statuses and age.
- Future income from work, y_{t+1} , which depends on current wage, occupation, health statuses, and age.
- Whether the individual will receive benefits if he applies for SSDI, which depends on occupation and function limitations: $p(DI_t^{rec}|DI_t^{app}, OCC_t, d_t) < 1$.

The agent's continuation value for decisions \mathcal{D}_t at time t , given state space \mathcal{S}_t is

$$V(\mathcal{S}_t) = \max_{\mathcal{D}_t} V(\mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) \quad (1)$$

where $V(\mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t)$ includes the current period utility $u(\cdot)$ plus future discounted utility, which depends on survival $s(h_t, t)$:

$$V(\mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) = u(\cdot) + \beta [s(h_t, t)EV_{t+1}(\mathcal{S}_{t+1}) + (1 - s(h_t, t))B(A_t)] , \quad (2)$$

with the future expected continuation value defined as

$$EV(\mathcal{S}_{t+1}) = \max_{\mathcal{D}_{t+1}} \int V(\mathcal{S}_{t+1}, \mathcal{D}_{t+1}, \epsilon_{t+1}) dF(\mathcal{S}_{t+1} | \mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) \quad (3)$$

and

$$dF(\mathcal{S}_{t+1} | \mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t) = f^h(h_{t+1}|h_t, t) \times f^d(d_{t+1}|d_t, t) \times f^d(DI_t^{rec}|d_t, OCC_t, DI_t^{app}) \\ \times f^w(w_{t+1}|w_t, h_t, d_t, OCC_t)dw_{t+1} .$$

From equation (2), current period utility, which is specified below, will depend on current consumption, c_t , labor force participation, p_t , health, h_t , and whether one has applied for DI, DI_t^{app} . The future period is discounted at factor β ; with probability $s(h_t, t)$ the agent survives to the next period, otherwise he leaves a bequest over which he receives utility $B(A_t)$. The individual does not know what his precise health, disability, DI receipt, wage or survival status will be in the future periods, but he does know the probability distribution conditional on his current health status, age, wage, and occupation. These transition probabilities are described in detail in Appendix A. In practice, to calculate $EV(\mathcal{S}_{t+1})$ in equation (3), requires that for each alternative-specific shock vector ϵ , the sample mean of $\max_{\mathcal{D}_t} V(\mathcal{S}_t, \mathcal{D}_t)$ is used as an approximation.

Consumption c_t must satisfy the following budget constraint, with $Y(\cdot)$ being income that includes income from work and transfers:

$$c_t \leq \begin{cases} [1 + r(1 - \tau)] A_t + Y(\cdot) & \text{if } A_t \geq 0 \\ Y(\cdot) & \text{if } A_t < 0 \end{cases}$$

so that in each period savings is allowed but additional borrowing is not. Assets evolve as follows:

$$A_{t+1} = [1 + r(1 - \tau)] A_t + Y(w_t + g_t + OASI_{t-1}^{rec} + DI_t^{rec}, \tau) - c_t,$$

where r is interest earned on savings, g_t is a consumption floor,⁹ and τ captures the tax structure.

4.2 Preferences

Preference specification. Utility in time t is assumed to be CRRA and is specified by

$$u_t = u(c_t, L_t, p_t, \varepsilon_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \eta} (c_t^{\alpha_c} L_t^{1 - \alpha_c})^{1 - \eta} + \alpha_{X^D} \varepsilon_t(\mathcal{D}_t). \quad (4)$$

The weight on consumption relative to leisure is given by α_c , and η (with $\eta > 0$) measures the degree of curvature of the function from which we obtain measures of risk aversion and labor supply elasticity ($= 1/\eta$). Parameter vector α_{X^D} weighs the preference shocks associated with decisions on occupation labor force participation, OASI or SSDI application, and consumption in that period. The utility costs of work, receiving SSDI, and performing work while in poor health enter through the leisure component of utility. A number of utility parameters come through the L_t leisure variable, which is given by

$$\begin{aligned} L_t = & L - N_t - \varphi_p \mathbb{1}_{\{p_t=1\}} - \varphi_{DI} \mathbb{1}_{\{DI_t^{app}=1\}} \\ & - \varphi_{BC,h^p} \mathbb{1}_{\{OCC=BC, h=poor, p_t=1\}} - \varphi_{WC,h^p} \mathbb{1}_{\{OCC=WC, h=poor, p_t=1\}} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

and is measured in hours. It enters utility as a function of total hours available, L , number of hours worked, N_t , and the psychic fixed costs—or possible benefits—of working (φ_p), receiving disability insurance benefits (φ_{DI}), working in a blue-collar job while in poor health (φ_{BC,h^p}), and working in a white-collar job while in poor health (φ_{WC,h^p}).¹⁰

If the individual does not survive to time t , which occurs with probability $1 - s(h_t, t)$, he gets utility from bequest

$$B(A_t) = \frac{\alpha_B (A_t + K_0)^{(1 - \eta_B) \alpha_c}}{1 - \eta_B}$$

and zero utility thereafter to age 90, with the functional form just as in French and Jones (2011). Here, α_B represents the utility weight on bequests and K_0 gives the extent to which

⁹Following French and Jones (2011) and Hubbard et al. (1995), outside transfers g_t provide a consumption floor so that $c_t \geq \underline{c} > 0$:

$$g_t = \max\{0, \underline{c} - (A_t + Y_t(\cdot))\}.$$

Consumption floor \underline{c} is important for the identification of estimated risk aversion levels.

¹⁰As an alternative to the consequences of working while poor health entering through leisure, in Jacobs (2014), the cost comes solely through the effect on wages, which similarly is allowed to differ depending on occupation. As poor health has larger estimated negative effects on wages for those in blue-collar jobs, we should expect estimates to be such that $\varphi_{BC,h^p} > \varphi_{WC,h^p}$.

Table 4: Summary of Variables

<i>Description</i>	
<i>State Variables:</i>	
t	Age at time t
p_{t-1}	Participation decision last period
A_t	Total assets (quintile)
h_t	Health status: good, fair and poor
d_t	Functional limitation (binary)
OCC	Occupation
$AIME_t$	Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (SS Covered Income History)
<i>Choice Variables:</i>	
p_t	Labor force participation (none, PT, FT)
c_t	Consumption/savings
$OASI_t$	OASI benefit claiming
DI_t	SSDI benefit application
<i>Preference Parameters:</i>	
α_c	Consumption weight
β	Time discount factor
η	Coefficient of relative risk
N_t	Fixed utility cost of work, intercept
φ_p	Utility cost of work, with time trend
φ_{BC,h^p}	Utility cost of working in poor health, BC occupation
φ_{WC,h^p}	Utility cost of working in poor health, WC occupation
φ_{DI}	Utility cost of applying for DI
θ_b	Bequest weight
K_0	Bequest shifter

bequests are a luxury good.¹¹

As will be described further in Section 5 below, agents can differ by type in preference parameters η (risk aversion) and φ_p (the fixed utility cost of performing work). Indeed, this preference heterogeneity plays an important role in matching observed work, savings, and OASI claiming behaviors. Table 4 summarizes the variables included in the model.

The following section will describe the procedure for estimating these parameters and present estimates.

¹¹It is difficult to distinguish bequest motives from precautionary savings without K_0 , which De Nardi et al. (2010) use to measure the level of wealth at which savings can be interpreted as bequest motives as opposed to precautionary savings.

5 Estimation and Results

5.1 Procedure

The preference parameters of the model presented in Section 4 estimated in two main stages as in Gourinchas and Parker (2002), French and Jones (2011), and others. The first-stage estimates are of parameters that are not generated through the model but come from outside. These include the distributions and transition processes for earned income, health and disability, and survival—which are estimated from HRS data—and the rate of return on assets and the discount rate, which are taken from estimates in existing literature. These parameters are then transferred into the second stage of estimation.

In the second stage, the utility parameters are estimated along with the preference type prediction parameters through *method of simulated moments*. Through this process, the parameters that generate simulated behavior that aligns most closely, in a *generalized method of moments* sense, with behavior observed in the data for select data moments are found through an iterative process, as described in subsection A.3. The estimation procedure is described in greater detail in Appendix A.

5.2 Data Moments

The moments capture the main behavior the model seeks to explain. Below is a sketch of how the parameters are identified through matching as closely as possible the various simulated and real data moments. The parameters for this model are estimated using a total of 184 data moments, while additional moments may be used to validate the model:

- *Median assets by age category (55-59, 60-64, 75-79), income quintile, and occupation.*¹² This gives $3 \times 5 \times 2 = 30$ moments. These moments are relevant since, given the same level of permanent income, we would expect a blue-collar worker who faces on average fewer potential productive working years to save more than the white-collar worker does. Variation in assets held helps identify risk aversion parameters for types as well as the bequest motive at higher asset levels.
- *Proportion working part-time or full-time by age (55-59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66-70), occupation, and health status.* This makes $2 \times 8 \times 2 \times 2 = 64$ moments. These moments reflect the primary labor supply decisions of interest, which should be generated by the model. This, in addition to the asset moments, helped identify η , as more risk averse types would tend to work more hours at younger ages in order to save more.
- *Percent applying for SSDI by age (55-59 and 60-64), permanent income quintile, health status, and occupation.* This gives $2 \times 5 \times 2 \times 2 = 40$ moments. These moments recover

¹²Income here is the “permanent income” measure that come from respondents’ AIME levels.

the hassle or utility cost parameter of applying for SSDI.

- *OASI claiming status by age (62, 63–64, 65–66, 67–70), occupation, and permanent income quintile.* This gives $5 \times 2 \times 5 = 50$ moments.

Additional moments are used to test the performance of the model in capturing behaviors of interest here, including assets by age, occupation, and disability status, which is described further in Section 6.

5.3 Discussion of Results

The results from the parameter estimation are presented in Table 5, where preference parameters shared across individuals are in the upper panel and those differing by type are in the lower panel. Here I will briefly interpret the estimates, highlighting their sensitivity to specific modelling and data choices when relevant.

Beginning with the consumption weight α_c , it is, at .49, in the range of estimated from other estimated models; this measure might look higher if the behavior of interest was of somewhat younger men. The utility cost of work that varies with age, φ_p is 15. The interpretation of this is that as one ages, assuming health and other factors are unchanged, it feels *as if* one is experiencing 15 fewer hours of leisure each year. As mentioned earlier, this is one component of the model that brings about increasing exit from the labor force with age.

The utility costs of working in poor health in either occupation, φ_{BC,h^p} and φ_{WC,h^p} , which are identified by moments of exit from work of blue- and white-collar workers by age and health status, show that working in poor health is more costly when the work is in a blue collar job (as if there is 301 fewer hours of leisure to enjoy during the year). This is one part of the model, along with wages, that generates relatively earlier retirement for those in blue-collar jobs, all else equal. These results are most sensitive to the earnings profiles, which differ by occupation.

The bequest function parameter θ_b , the estimated weight placed on bequests, is somewhat lower than expected, though this may be a result of considering only non-housing financial assets, as housing is a major component of realized bequests. The bequest shifter K_0 , at about \$212,000, represents the baseline level of assets for which assets beyond that can be assumed to be intentional bequests.

As for the shared preference parameters, the agent *Types* are distributed roughly evenly across high and low levels of risk aversion, with 47 percent predicted to have lower levels of risk aversion ($\eta = 2.67$) and 53 percent higher ($\eta = 5.02$). Risk aversion η levels are in some sense higher than anticipated given that the asset measure they are identified through—non-housing financial assets—would tend to show lower risk aversion than, say, assets with housing included. However this is perhaps less surprising considering the low bequest weight θ_b ; less importance is placed on leaving bequests, so more savings is interpreted as precautionary rather than intentional bequests.

Table 5: *Parameter Estimates*

<i>Shared Preference Parameters</i>		<i>Estimates</i>			
α_c	Consumption weight	.49			
φ_p	Utility cost of work, time trend	15			
φ_{BC,h^p}	Cost of working in poor health, BC	301 (hours)			
φ_{WC,h^p}	Cost of working in poor health, WC	125 (hours)			
φ_{DI}	Cost of applying for SSDI	298 (hours)			
θ_b	Bequest weight	.01			
K_0	Bequest shifter	212 (\$1,000s)			
<i>Type-Specific Preference Parameters*</i>		<i>Type 1</i>	<i>Type 2</i>	<i>Type 3</i>	<i>Type 4</i>
		(32%)	(15%)	(22%)	(31%)
η	Risk aversion	2.67	2.67	5.02	5.02
N_t	Fixed cost of work (hours)	114	340	114	340
<i>Percent in each Type category</i>		BC		WC	
Type 1		34		30	
Type 2		22		12	
Type 3		17		25	
Type 4		27		33	

Turning to the lower panel of Table 5, we have for each occupation the percent estimated to be of each of the four Type categories.

5.3.1 Results on correlation between occupation and estimated time preference or risk aversion.

6 Simulated Profiles with Counterfactual Policies

Taking the estimated preference parameters, I use the model to simulate labor supply, Social Security OASI claiming, SSDI application rates, and savings for agents facing alternative two Social Security policy changes. The first involves raising the Early Retirement Age from 62 to 64, keeping the FRA as is (65 to 66 for those in the HRS data over which the model was estimated). The second raises the FRA to age 68, keeping the ERA at age 62.¹³

¹³For the purposes of simplifying presentation, I show only these two counterfactual policies. Looking at the effects of alternative policies (e.g., increasing both the ERA and FRA, increasing the FRA to 70, etc.) can also be done and is relatively straightforward to simulate.

Two findings highlighted here are that (1) increasing the Early Retirement Age has larger labor supply and disutility effects for blue-collar workers, and results in greater DI application (2) increasing the Full Retirement Age affects the labor supply of white-collar workers more than for blue-collar workers, however it does increase the savings somewhat for the latter group. In Table 6, these and several other responses to counterfactual policy changes are summarized relative to the simulated moments under the policy in the model.

6.1 Responses to Counterfactual Policies

6.1.1 Increasing the Early Retirement Age

The middle column of Table 6 shows the effect of increasing the ERA to 64 on a number of behaviors. The first is the number of years worked between the ages of 60–69. With the existing claiming age structure, those (simulated) in blue-collar occupations worked 4.07 out of those ten years and those in white-collar occupations worked over one year more on average, 5.14 years. When the ERA is raised to 64, BC workers respond primarily by working longer, 5.19 years from 60–69 and save only slightly more at about \$18K versus under \$16K.

Also worth noting is the interaction between SSDI application and increased claiming ages across occupations. SSDI application for those in BC occupations goes up by almost 6 percent while for WC the rate increases by under 2 percent. Regardless of occupation, those applying now for SSDI were disproportionately early OASI claimers under the status quo policy.

Finally, welfare loss resulting from increasing the ERA is lower for those in WC occupations, who experience a welfare loss of 2.1 percent compared to 5.7 percent for those in BC occupations. This is presumably because WC workers can adjust along the lines of labor supply in a less costly way. In summary, raising the ERA seems to be especially costly for the typical blue-collar worker. This is driven primarily by the fact that those in blue-collar work have more steeply declining productivity with age and are also more likely to be the lower η preference type, which wants to hold fewer assets giving less margin on which to respond to policy changes.¹⁴

6.1.2 Increasing the Full Retirement Age

The rightmost column of Table 6 shows behavior when the FRA is raised to age 68. Comparing to labor supply changes when the ERA is raised, the effects for BC workers are quite minimal, and a smaller than the effects for WC workers; the number of years worked while aged 60–69 goes up by only .08 years for BC workers compared to nearly .7 years for WC workers.

¹⁴All counterfactual responses are sensitive to the fact that simulated agents are behaving as if they were aware of the counterfactual policy at age 50. This would overstate welfare loss if in fact the policy were known at an earlier age as agents would have more periods over which to adjust.

Increasing the FRA has the effect for both occupations of decreasing the percent who claim OASI benefits at the ERA, and more so for WC workers than for BC workers. The effect, however, is very small compared to the large *increase* due to raising the ERA. For workers in both occupations, the rate of SSDI application goes up—by 4.6 percentage points for BC workers and by 3.6 percentage points for WC workers, which is a relatively higher increase for the latter.

Generally, for all behaviors, raising the ERA induces more of a response from BC workers, while raising the FRA has a relatively greater response for WC workers.

7 Discussion and Future Work

This paper has shown some notably different patterns arising around transitions to retirement between those who have spent most of their working life in more physically intense blue-collar jobs and those in less physically demanding white-collar jobs. These differences arise in areas of savings, the timing of retirement, the age at which Social Security OASI

Table 6: *Summary of Counterfactual Policy Results*

		Status Quo	<i>Policy</i> Raising ERA	Raising FRA
Labor Supply: Years worked 60-69				
	BC	4.07	5.19	4.15
	WC	5.14	5.47	5.82
OASI ERA claiming				
	BC	49.5%	65.2	44.4
	WC	37.8	57.7	31.4
SSDI application rate				
	BC	21.2%	26.9	25.8
	WC	11.3	12.8	14.9
Welfare changes*				
	BC	-	-5.7%	-4.4
	WC	-	-2.1	-3.1
Savings (median, age 55-59, in \$1,000s)				
	BC	\$15.5	17.9	16.1
	WC	30.7	33.2	32.9

*These changes are calculated for age 50 on for average characteristics.

benefits are claimed, and in applications and receipt of SSDI benefits. While some of these disparate patterns may arise from different average preferences, another driver is the more steeply-declining productivity in blue-collar jobs that comes with increases in age and health problems. These patterns have served as a motivation in this paper for considering whether any changes to existing Social Security would be responded to differently on average across occupations.

As the nature of work changes and the size of the older population continues to grow, understanding connections among occupations, health and aging, and the responses to changes in Social Security programs will become increasingly important. Here particularly we have predicted, after constructing and estimating the parameters of a dynamic model of decision making around retirement, how people would respond to increases in the Early and Full Retirement Ages (ERA and FRA). Similar to other papers, the number of years worked in response has increased overall, but here we saw the novel result that, among other differences, blue-collar workers were especially responsive to increases in the ERA. They also saw a greater decline in well-being through welfare estimates than those in white-collar jobs for both counterfactual policies. Such findings are relevant for both projection, evaluative, and even political purposes with one group of people being more intensely affected by a potential policy change.

Going forward, there are a few technical changes to the analysis that could yield additional or altered results. The biggest immediate issues are: (1) what measure of assets should be used and how housing would be included, (2) handling finer occupations, and (3) thinking about earnings estimates in greater detail. Some additional calculations made from the counterfactual exercises would also be interesting. For example, we could decompose how much of the welfare loss is due to needing to save more or versus needing to work more, which is complex as blue- and white-collar workers are not distributed evenly across predicted preference types. Beyond this, a valuable future direction of this work would be to estimate fiscal impact of policy changes given the more complete distributional picture studies like this one can provide.

References

- Behaghel, L. and D. Blau (2012). Framing social security reform: Behavioral response to changes in the full retirement age. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 4, 41–67.
- Casanova, M. (2013). Revisiting the hump-shaped wage profile: Implications for structural labor supply estimation. *Working Paper*.
- Chirikos, T. and G. Nestel (1991). Occupational differences in the ability of men to delay retirement. *Journal of Human Resources* 26, 1–26.
- Coe, N. B. and K. Haverstick (2010). Measuring the spillover to disability insurance due to the rise in the full retirement age. *Boston College Center for Retirement Research Working Paper*.
- Coile, C. and K. S. Milligan (2017). *Health Capacity to Work at Older Ages: Evidence from the United States*, Chapter 12, pp. 359–394. in *Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: The Capacity to Work at Older Ages*.
- Cutler, D. M., E. Meara, and S. Richards-Shubik (2013). Health and work capacity of older adults: Estimates and implications for social security policy. *NBER Working Paper*.
- De Nardi, M., E. French, and J. Jones (2010). The effects of health insurance and self-insurance on retirement behavior. *Journal of Political Economy* 118(1), 39–75.
- Duggan, M., P. Singleton, and J. Song (2007). Aching to retire? the rise in the full retirement age and its impact on the disability rolls. *Journal of Public Economics* 91, 1327–1350.
- Engelman, M. and H. Jackson (2015). The role of occupations in differentiating health trajectories in later life. *Boston College Center for Retirement Research Working Paper*.
- French, E. (2005). The effects of health, wealth, and wages on labour supply and retirement behaviour. *The Review of Economic Studies* 72(2), 395–427.
- French, E. and J. B. Jones (2011). The effects of health insurance and self-insurance on retirement behavior. *Econometrica* 79(3), pp. 693–732.
- Gourinchas, P.-O. and J. A. Parker (2002). Consumption over the life cycle. *Econometrica* 70(1), 47–89.
- Gustman, A. and T. Steinmeier (2005). The social security early entitlement age in a structural model of retirement and wealth. *Journal of Public Economics* 89, 441–463.
- Gustman, A. and T. Steinmeier (2015). Effects of social security policies on benefit claiming, retirement and saving. *Journal of Public Economics* 129, 51–62.
- Haveman, R., P. D. Jong, and B. Wolfe (1991). Disability transfers and the work decision of older men. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, 939–949.

- Hayward, M., W. Grady, M. Hardy, and D. Sommers (1989). Occupation influences on retirement, disability, and death. *Demography* 26, 393–409.
- Hirsch, B., D. Macpherson, and M. Hardy (2000). Occupational age structure and access for older workers. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 53, 401–418.
- Hubbard, R., J. Skinner, and S. Zeldes (1995). Precautionary saving and social insurance. *Journal of Political Economy* 103, pp. 360–399.
- Hudomiet, P., M. D. Hurd, S. Rohwedder, and R. J. Willis (2018). The effect of physical and cognitive decline at older ages on job mismatch and retirement. *NBER Working Paper*.
- Jacobs, L. (2016). Occupational choice, retirement, and the effects of disability insurance. *FEDS Working Paper*.
- Keane, M. and K. Wolpin (1997). The career decisions of young men. *Journal of Political Economy* 105, 473–522.
- Kreider, B. (1999). Social security disability insurance: Applications, awards, and lifetime income flows. *Journal of Labor Economics* 17, 784–827.
- Lahiri, K., J. Song, and B. Wixon (2008). A model of social security disability insurance using matched sipp/administrative data. *Journal of Econometrics* 145, 4–20.
- Li, X. and N. Maestas (2008). Does the rise in the full retirement age encourage disability benefits applications? evidence from the health and retirement study. *Michigan Retirement Research Center Working Paper*.
- Modrek, S. and M. R. Cullen (2012). Job demand and early retirement. *Boston College Center for Retirement Research Working Paper*.
- Rust, J. and C. Phelan (1997). How social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets. *Econometrica* 65(4), 781–831.
- Rutledge, M. S., S. A. Sass, and J. D. Ramos-Mercado (2017). How does occupational access for older workers differ by education? *Journal of Labor Research* 38, 283–305.
- Staubli, S. and J. Zweimuller (2013). Does raising the early retirement age increase employment of older workers? *Journal of Public Economics* 108, 17–32.
- U.S. Social Security Administration Board of Trustees (2019). The 2019 annual report of the board of trustees of the federal old-age and survivors insurance and federal disability insurance trust funds.
- van der Klaauw, W. and K. Wolpin (2008). Social security and the retirement and savings behavior of low-income households. *Journal of Econometrics* 145, 21–42.

A Appendix: Parameter Estimation

A.1 First-Stage Estimates

A.1.1 Health and Disability Transitions

The transition processes for overall, self-reported health (h) that may diminish productivity in work and lead to greater levels of precautionary savings is shown, conditional on current health and age, in Table 7 for select ages. In this table, we see that the probability of remaining in good health declines with age, as does the probability of transitioning from poor to good health. While the distribution of health is somewhat different for those in blue-collar and white-collar occupations, the transition probabilities themselves are not significantly different, at least at the older ages analyzed here. While the transition process faced by individuals does not depend on occupation, we will see in the wage estimates shown in Table 9 that the effects on productivity of worsening health are greater for those in blue-collar occupations.

A.1.2 Functional Limitation Transition Process

The probability of a functional limitation being present in the next period and limiting work depends on an individual's current self-reported health (h_t), occupation (OCC_t), and existing functional limitation status (d_t). The probability of having at least one functional limitation in the next period, given that an individual is in good health in the current period is shown in Table 8. We can see that the conditional probability of a functional limitation arising is always greater for those in blue-collar jobs; though interpretation of this is not entirely

Table 7: *Sample Health Transition Probabilities*

		Next Period Health		
		G/VG/E	Fair	Poor
Age=55	Current Health			
	G/VG/E	.89	.09	.02
	Fair	.44	.35	.21
Age=65	Current Health			
	G/VG/E	.85	.13	.02
	Fair	.44	.38	.18
Age=72	Current Health			
	G/VG/E	.81	.16	.02
	Fair	.40	.38	.22
	Current Health			
	Poor	.15	.35	.50
	Poor	.13	.33	.55
	Poor	.12	.32	.56

Table 8: *Probability of Having at least one Functional Limitation Preventing Work Next Period for Select Ages and Good Health by Occupation*

Age	BC Career		WC Career	
	<i>Current Limitation</i>		<i>Current Limitation</i>	
	No	Yes	No	Yes
55	.47	.53	.72	.28
65	.42	.58	.56	.44

Table 9: *Wage Equation Estimates*

Outcome: $\ln Annual\ Earnings$		
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>(s.e.)</i>
Age (years)	.111	(.028)
Age ²	-.001	(.000)
Functional Limitation, f_{it}		
White-Collar	-.006	(.018)
Blue-Collar	-.079	(.019)
Poor Health, h_{it}		
White-Collar	-.015	(.015)
Blue-Collar	-.052	(.017)
Full-Time Work, N_{it}	.740	(.032)
$\hat{\rho}$ (autoreg. coeff.)	.940	(.019)
$\hat{\sigma}_v^2$ (trans.)	.031	(.009)

Note: Observations n=18,052, individuals=5,216. Controls for year and Census division. Being just above Early and Full Social Security claiming ages used as exclusion restrictions.

straightforward. Because more physical jobs have a higher standard for physical capability, whether significant loss of a function prohibits work depends on the nature of the work. Furthermore, even if the functional limitation does not prohibit work altogether, as with worsening general health, it does result in a greater loss of earnings for those in blue-collar jobs, as presented in Table 9.

A.1.3 Wage Estimates

This is an important aspect: BC worked exit earlier due to more steeply declining wages and increasingly greater disutility from physical work.

Estimated wages depend on age, health, and functional limitations interacted with occupation. Specifically,

$$\begin{aligned} \ln w_t = & + \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 N_t + \gamma_2 \text{Age}_t + \gamma_3 \text{Age}_t^2 \\ & + \gamma_4 \mathbb{1}_{\{BC, \text{poor } H\}} + \gamma_5 \mathbb{1}_{\{WC, \text{poor } H\}} \\ & + \gamma_6 \mathbb{1}_{\{BC, \text{func. lim.}\}} + \gamma_7 \mathbb{1}_{\{WC, \text{func. lim.}\}} + \varsigma_t \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

autoregressive component $\varsigma_t = \rho \varsigma_{t-1} + \nu_t$, with correlation coefficient ρ and transitory shock $\nu_t \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$. It is assumed that the individual knows ς_{t-1} and the distribution of future ν_t but not ν_t itself.

A.1.4 Mortality Profiles

Both Casanova (2013) and French (2005) compute their conditional survival probabilities using Bayes' Rule, with

$$\begin{aligned} s(h_t, t) &= \Pr(\text{Survive}_t | t_{t-1} = h) \\ &= \frac{\Pr(h_{t-1} = h | \text{Survive}_t)}{P(h_{t-1} = h)} \times \Pr(\text{Survive}_t) \quad \text{for } h = \text{good, bad.} \end{aligned}$$

I assume that individuals die with probability one at age 90 regardless of health status, so $P(\text{Survive}_{90} | H_{89} = h) = 0$ for all h .¹⁵

A.2 Preference Heterogeneity

The preference type prediction parameters are also found in the second stage. I assume that there are four preference types, with agents possibly differing on the coefficient of relative risk aversion η and cost of performing work (high N_t) parameters: (1) *Type 1* is less risk averse (low η) and has a lower cost of working (low N_t); (2) *Type 2* is less risk averse (low η) and has a higher cost of working (high N_t); (3) *Type 3* is more risk averse (high η) and has a lower cost of working (low N_t); and (4) *Type 4* is more risk averse (high η) and has a higher cost of working (high N_t). Though η is sometimes determined outside of the model in similar studies,¹⁶ I estimate this in the second stage and allow it to differ by type given that, as we will see, this parameter plays a significant role in determining the cost of health and

¹⁵Survival probabilities are obtained from the U.S. Social Security Administration's *Office of the Chief Actuary* reports: Actuarial Study 120, "Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100" by Felicitie C. Bell and Michael L. Miller. Available at <http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as120/LOT.html>. These give one-year survival probabilities at age t by sex and birth year cohort, conditional on survival up to age t . I use the 1945 birth year cohort (the birth years in the sample ranging from 1938 to 1953).

¹⁶For example, ? set a parameter with roughly the same interpretation as η in this paper to 1.5, while ? set the coefficient of relative of risk aversion to 3 for their exercises.

disability risks and, consequently, the value of disability insurance. I allow for heterogeneity in N_t to account for different inclinations to work.

To predict the types, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression within the second stage, where the probability of individual i being *Type* n , $n = 1, 2, 3, 4$, is

$$\Pr(i=Type\ n) = \frac{\exp(\beta_n \mathbf{X}_i)}{1 + \sum_{k \neq n} \exp(\beta_k \mathbf{X}_i)} \quad (7)$$

where

$$\beta_n \mathbf{X}_i = \beta_{n,0} + \beta_{n,1}(\text{Assets at } 50)_i + \beta_{n,2}(\text{Work Enjoyment})_i + \beta_{n,3}(\text{Income Gamble})_i,$$

so that the probability of having a high or low η and N_t is predicted by an HRS respondent's assets relative to permanent income at age 50, responses to a work enjoyment question, and responses to a gambling question intended to capture risk aversion.

A.3 Computational Procedure

First, the agents problem expressed in equation (1) is solved for a given set of parameters, in which the optimal savings (and equivalently consumption) is computed conditional on each labor supply choice p_t (full-time, part-time, and not working), Social Security Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI) benefit claiming choice $OASI^{app}$ (which can be claimed at age 62 or later), and Disability Insurance (DI) application DI^{app} . Next, whether to apply for DI and then whether to apply for OASI. Finally, the optimal participation choice in any period is the one that yields the greatest value given the optimal savings, DI and OASI application choice, and the realization of the preference shock $\epsilon_t(P_t)$. Next the outer maximization problem of searching across parameters to find the set which generates the behavior of simulated individuals that best matches the data is solved using the two-stage approach.

The parameters estimated in the first stage are represented by $\hat{\chi}$. Further, let θ denote the vector of parameters estimated in the second stage, which includes parameters of utility function, fixed costs of work, and type prediction. The estimator $\hat{\theta}$ is given by

$$\hat{\theta} = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \hat{\varphi}(\theta, \hat{\chi})' \Omega \hat{\varphi}(\theta, \hat{\chi}) \quad (8)$$

where $\hat{\varphi}$ denotes the vector of moment conditions described below, and Ω is a symmetric weighting matrix. The weighting matrix contains the inverse of the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimates of the sample moments along and off the diagonal.

The solution to (8) is obtained by the following procedure

1. First compute sample moments and corresponding weighting matrix Ω from the sample data.

2. From the same data, generate an initial joint distribution for wages, health, functional limitations and disability, AIME, assets, occupation type, and variables used in estimating the preference type assigned using the type prediction equation (described in Subsection A.2). Some of the first-stage parameters contained in χ are also estimated from these data.
3. Using $\hat{\chi}$, generate matrices of random health, disability, wage, mortality, and work preference shocks for 3,000 simulated individuals.
4. Each simulated individual receives a draw from the initial distribution in Step 2, and is assigned one of the simulated sequences of shocks from Step 3.
5. Given $\hat{\chi}$ and an initial guess of parameter values contained in θ , compute the decision rules over the entire state space and generate simulated decision profiles for the decision variables.
6. Compute moment conditions by finding the distance between the simulated moments from Step 5 and true moments, solving equation (8).
7. Using an updated value of θ , evaluate the value function over the state space and compute decisions for the simulated distribution of preference types, repeating Steps 4 through 7 until the $\hat{\theta}$ that minimizes (8) is found.

B Appendix: Existing Policy and Counterfactual Policy Change Specifics

Under current OASI claiming eligibility rules, a covered worker's monthly benefit level, the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is determined by his earnings history, including the highest 35 years of earnings subject to FICA taxes. The full old-age benefit can be claimed at the Full Retirement Age (FRA), and the PIA is determined by when benefits are claimed relative to the worker's FRA. The FRA is between age 65 and 67 depending on one's birth year. Benefits can be claimed starting at the Early Retirement Age (ERA) of 62 regardless of the covered worker's birth year.

Claiming at the ERA results in a reduction in the PIA of 20 percent for those with an FRA of 65, 25 percent for those with an FRA of 66, and 30 percent for those with an FRA of 67. First claiming after one's ERA but before one's FRA results in a decrease proportional to time to FRA, while waiting to claim until after one's FRA increases the PIA amount up to age 70.¹⁷

The model estimates are obtained with the existing OASI rules in place, and the simulated behavior is analyzed under two counterfactual policies. The first policy, raising the ERA to age 64 and keeping the FRA as is compresses the effects for the PIA calculation. For someone

¹⁷An example PIA calculation can be found here: <https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/agereduction.html>.

with an FRA of 66, claiming at the new ERA of 64 would reduce benefits by 25 percent, while claiming in between at age 65 would reduce benefits by 12.5 percent, for example. Under the second counterfactual policy, where the FRA is raised to 68 but the ERA stays at 62, claiming at the ERA would still result in a decrease of 20 percent, while claiming at what was the former FRA of 66 would result in a PIA that is 6.67 percent lower than the full amount.



Center for Financial Security

School of Human Ecology
University of Wisconsin-Madison

1300 Linden Drive
Madison, WI 53706

608-890-0229
cfs@mailplus.wisc.edu
cfs.wisc.edu